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Abstract: Engaged research emphasizes researcher–stakeholder collaborations as means  
of improving the relevance of research outcomes and the chances for science-based 
decision-making. Sustainability science, as a form of engaged research, depends on the 
collaborative abilities and cooperative tendencies of researchers. We use an economic 
experiment to measure cooperation between university faculty, local citizens, and faculty 
engaged in a large sustainability science project to test a set of hypotheses: (1) faculty on 
the sustainability project will cooperate more with local residents than non-affiliated 
faculty, (2) sustainability faculty will have the highest level of internal cooperation of any 
group, and (3) that cooperation may vary due to academic training and culture in different 
departments amongst sustainability faculty. Our results demonstrate that affiliation with the 
sustainability project is not associated with differences in cooperation with local citizens or 
with in-group peers, but that disciplinary differences amongst sustainability faculty do 
correlate with cooperative tendencies within our sample. We also find that non-affiliated 
faculty cooperated less with each other than with faculty affiliated with the sustainability 
project. We conclude that economic experiments can be useful in discovering patterns of 
prosociality within institutional settings, and list challenges for further applications. 
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1. Introduction 
Leaders in the emerging field of sustainability science emphasize the importance of forging research 
collaborations that span organizational boundaries, disciplinary cultures and involve stakeholders in the 
research process as a central, defining feature of the endeavor [1]. These boundary-spanning efforts are 
seen as improving the legitimacy of the research in the view of society at large, and as improving the 
research itself by allowing research to be co-directed and the resultant knowledge to be co-produced by 
both scientists and stakeholders [2,3]. 
However, organizational and cultural boundaries are notoriously difficult to bridge. Many attempts 
as forging interdisciplinary, inter-organizational and cross-cultural collaborations fail. It is also 
difficult to detect the reason why some efforts to straddle those boundaries fail while others succeed. 
Do efforts aimed at improving the ability of scientists to work across such boundaries have a lasting 
impact on their collaborations, or willingness to cooperate with non-scientists? Here, we take 
advantage of a large collaborative sustainability science project to conduct experimental measurements 
of cooperation between research faculty and citizens. 
In recent decades, behavioral experiments, a staple of psychology, have been incorporated into 
economics [4–6] and anthropology [7–9]. Behavioral experiments in economics have contributed to an 
important theoretical debate on the validity of rational actor theory [10]. Anthropologists use 
experimental methods to measure the influence of cultural variation on behavior, and argue for the 
importance of culture as a primary force of individual behavior and social change [11]. The 
interdisciplinary use of experimental methods seems to have enabled a new energy for synthesizing the 
core insights of the traditionally segregated social sciences. Experimental methods are therefore a 
valuable tool for building theoretical consensus. We argue that behavioral experiments also hold huge 
potential as an applied research tool. 
Economic experiments in particular have a few features that lend themselves to applied questions of 
behavior within institutional settings. Economic experiments are conducted without deception, they 
employ incentives, and typically participants are given a full understanding of the complete game 
structure. These features, with appropriate customization of game structures and framing, allow 
applied practitioners to ask the question “how do individuals behave in a simplified, known context”? 
Generalized experiments such as the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the trust game can be 
used to measure individual differences in norms of altruism, sharing, and trust, respectively. These 
measurements, applied appropriately within an organization, can be useful in detecting the effects of 
institutional structure or changes in dimensions of social capital. Putnam [12,13] included trust, 
reciprocity, the capacity for collective action, social identity and local social networks in his definition 
of social capital. Cooperation in particular is also typically considered a prerequisite to collective 
action, and a component of social capital. Alternatively, economic experiments can be crafted to match 
a specific institutional and resource scenario, such as the irrigation systems in Thailand and Columbia [14]. 
In this paper we explore the use of economic experiments for applied institutional research in an 
Sustainability 2014, 6 1173 
 
 
academic setting in the former sense. We focus on a particular social change (a large research grant) in 
distinct institutional setting (a research university) as a source of individual behavioral change. 
1.1. Sustainability Solutions Initiative 
The Sustainability Solutions Initiative (SSI) is the result of a $20 million National Science 
Foundation research capacity building grant (#EPS-0904155) to the University of Maine. The SSI 
conducts sustainability science research on topics relevant to the state of Maine and includes research 
collaborations with ten partner institutions including many of the state’s public and private colleges 
and universities. The SSI research model emphasizes an interdisciplinary approach to sustainability 
research, with the majority of research teams composed of both biophysical and social scientists.  
SSI research is also stakeholder driven, and researchers strive to engage relevant stakeholders to help 
design the research, interpret the results, and facilitate societal solutions based upon the research 
results. In summary, the grant supports five years of this sustainability-related social-ecological 
systems (SESs) research to “connect knowledge with action in ways that promote strong economies, 
vibrant communities, and healthy ecosystems in and beyond Maine” [15], and is composed of thirty-one 
research projects organized around small teams of investigators. 
Universities are uniquely poised to serve as effective “boundary organizations” [16,17]. University 
projects like the SSI may have an enhanced ability to span other institutional and cultural boundaries in 
a sustained fashion to forge lasting connections. Boundary organizations create opportunities for 
collaboration between those in the scientific community and nonscientists [18–20]. To pursue 
beneficial solutions to societal challenges the SSI encourages its researchers to actively span the 
disciplinary, institutional, and cultural boundaries that often impede important partnerships. Many of 
the initiative’s projects include heavy collaboration with groups outside of the university. The SSI’s 
unique focus on boundary spanning renders its attempts to facilitate cross-boundary cooperation 
somewhat distinct from those of the overall university community. Therefore, we consider SSI to be a 
boundary organization for sustainability science. 
These collaborative efforts consume considerable time and energy. Williams [21] describes 
boundary spanning as a process of building relationships, which “demands an investment in time to 
forge an effective working relationship and a readiness to visualize reality from the perspective of 
others”. As a result, significant investments such as the NSF grant that created the SSI may be 
necessary to even begin such boundary spanning ventures. The question then arises, how successful 
are such major attempts at boundary spanning, and how can they be evaluated? 
Efforts within the SSI to span various institutional and cultural boundaries have already been 
studied [22], including the interdisciplinary boundaries between researchers [23,24], and those boundaries 
that must be overcome to enable community-based research partnerships [25]. Here we apply a novel 
experimental methodology to explore cooperation across key institutional and cultural boundaries. 
Three major boundaries that influence the outcomes of projects such as the SSI include the 
interdisciplinary boundary, the researcher–stakeholder boundary, and the town-gown boundary. These 
boundaries are distinct and carry separate challenges and complexities. The interdisciplinary boundary 
is well known to academics, and well-studied [26–28]. Within the SSI, faculty and doctoral students 
have been forced to face their significant disciplinary differences directly, with mixed results [23].  
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For SSI as for any academic research project, the interdisciplinary boundary is often the first and 
sometimes the only cultural or institutional boundary that researchers encounter, and it is fundamental, 
enduring, and poses considerable challenge for many research faculty [24]. 
A second critical boundary is that between academic researchers and stakeholders in the domains of 
society that sustainability science projects must reach. The researcher–stakeholder boundary is 
especially important in sustainability science and socially-engaged research projects [29]. In endeavors 
such as this project, stakeholders and researchers organize around a shared problem space, establish 
goals, work together to meet them, facilitating the growth of trust and increasingly efficient 
collaboration [21,30]. The SSI has successfully engaged a broad range of stakeholders across the state 
in problem-specific sustainability research [15]. 
A third boundary that is sometimes overlooked in sustainability science is that of the university 
relationship with the local community. Historically the relationships between a university and its local 
community, or “town and gown” cultural boundaries, have been especially difficult to bridge. Town 
and gown relationships are often characterized as ones in which mistrust limits collaboration [31]. 
However, there are examples of universities successfully engaging in research and other collaborations 
with local communities [31–34]. Silka [25] suggests that community based participatory research may 
benefit from adopting the some of the approaches of sustainability science. Similarly, boundary 
spanning organizations such as the SSI, in which major effort is directed toward the interdisciplinary 
boundary and the researcher-stakeholder boundary may be in the best position to also improve upon 
the town-gown relationship by forming, or being open to forming, researcher-citizen or project-municipal 
relationships and collaborations. 
An organization such as SSI has multiple collaborative boundaries to overcome, including the 
disciplinary boundary, the stakeholder-researcher boundary and the town-gown boundary. Each of 
these boundaries entails unique challenges [22], and may require different approaches. Nonetheless, 
cooperation is a critical component of all such collaborations. This paper uses economic experiments 
to explore the patterns of cooperation across the disciplinary boundary and the town-gown boundary, 
to provide insight into the patterns of collaboration that emerge from university-lead sustainability 
solutions projects. 
1.2. Study Description and Hypotheses 
We studied patterns of cooperative behavior between the three groups of interest: (I) University of 
Maine faculty; (II) University of Maine faculty members who are also members of the SSI; and (III) 
residents of the Bangor metropolitan region. These groups form a nested hierarchy, with the SSI at the 
center, encompassed by University of Maine, itself a sub-set of the greater Bangor region population 
(Figure 1). We used an economic experiment to measure cooperation between each of these groups. 
We created three hypotheses that follow on the collaborative nature of the SSI enterprise. First, the 
academic culture of SSI is focused on creating various types of partnerships outside the university. 
Thus, we consider it reasonable that SSI faculty will be more willing to cooperate with local partners 
on average than faculty from the rest of the university who have not been exposed to or supported in 
pursuing research with external stakeholders. Second, on the University of Maine’s central campus, 
SSI is composed of a relatively small group of some ~60 faculty who interact frequently for seminars, 
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brown bags and research and business meetings. This collaboration has bred familiarity and 
interdependency between these researchers. Thus we hypothesize an increased willingness of SSI 
members to cooperate with each other in comparison to other groups. Finally, the SSI faces the 
persistent challenge of disciplinary boundaries. Due to the differences between disciplines regarding 
ontology, epistemology and ideology i.e., [35] we hypothesize that disciplines will vary in their 
proclivity for cooperative research, and thus in our experimental measure of cooperation. In summary, 
we hypothesize that (I) SSI faculty will cooperate more with Bangor residents than will UMaine 
faculty at large; (II) SSI faculty will have the highest level of internal cooperation of any group; and 
(III) that cooperation may vary due to academic training and culture in different departments.  
We expand on each of these hypotheses below. 
Figure 1. Nested populations form the study groups. The Sustainability Solutions Initiative 
(SSI) is a small group of faculty within the University of Maine, which is itself a small part 
of the greater Bangor metropolitan region. 
 
2. Methods 
Economic measurements of social capital have tended to employ derivations of the trust game [36–38], 
which is asymmetrical in structure. Here, however, we aimed to measure the strength of commitment 
of two potential partners toward each other in a manner that matches the symmetry in a true 
mutualistic collaboration. Collaborative relationships such as those involved in University-community 
partnerships or interdisciplinary collaborations are symmetrical in nature. Because the trust game is 
asymmetrical, we instead used a public goods game to measure cooperation symmetrically. 
We employed a dyadic, one-shot, asynchronous public goods game to measure cooperation between 
the three nested populations. These economic experiments are very general in nature, and do not 
simulate the details of an actual collaborative endeavor. Instead, these games provide a simple 
measurement of cooperation as an indication of the likelihood of successful collaboration between two 
participants in a general sense. Each participant played one game with an anonymous randomly 
selected member of each of the three populations. The identity of game partners was also unknown to 
both the participants and the experimenters at the time of data collection. Six experimenters conducted 
a total of 600 games, three for each of exactly 200 individuals. We sampled 41 SSI faculty 
(constituting a 75% sample), 81 University of Maine faculty (~12% sample), and 78 Bangor residents 
(~0.23% sample). 
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Participation differed between faculty and Bangor resident populations out of necessity. Faculty 
members were interviewed on campus over a period of many weeks, while Bangor residents were 
interviewed at a central location over two days. Faculty were invited to participate first by email, then 
by follow-up phone calls, and individual sessions were scheduled with those who agreed to an 
interview. Sessions were held in a private location, most commonly faculty offices. At the time of 
implementation there were 55 SSI faculty, excluding four involved in or aware of this project. All 55 
were contacted, and 41 participated. The same procedure was used for a sample of non-SSI faculty 
selected randomly from a global list of nearly 700 UMaine faculty, of which 81 participated. 
Bangor area residents were selected at random from the Bangor telephone book and called with an 
invitation to participate. This method produced a lower yield than with faculty, so flyers were posted at 
locations of high pedestrian traffic in Bangor, and the experiment was posted on craigslist.org. The 
games were played at a public location (Bangor Parks and Recreation building) in downtown Bangor 
over the course of two weekend days. A total of 78 residents participated. Bangor participants sat in a 
waiting room from which they were escorted to private stations in a separate room where the interview 
was conducted, and finally to a payment station. 
Experimenters followed a script, and data were collected using touchscreen tablets to minimize 
human error. After cueing participants to read the informed consent notice on the tablet, experimenters 
retrieved the tablet, explained the game in detail and quizzed the participants about game mechanics in 
eight different situations. The number of errors was recorded. We did not provide any further 
information than the names of the groups participating—the participants cooperated based only on 
their previous knowledge of SSI, UMaine, and Bangor. Participants were then presented the three 
games in random order, for each of which they selected their single voluntary contribution. 
Each of the three public goods games proceeded as follows. Participants selected a partner group 
from a hat, and the experimenter enabled that experiment and handed the tablet to the participant. 
Players then chose the amount for contribution to the common fund out of a ten-dollar endowment for 
each game. For each game, the common fund was then multiplied by a factor of 1.5 and divided by 
two; this amount was distributed to the two players. Participants then selected one group from the hat 
for which they were not paid, and were paid for the remaining two games. Bangor participants were 
paid immediately, faculty participants were paid upon the completion of data collection. A brief 
questionnaire followed the contribution choices. 
After data collection was complete, random matches were made between players in all three groups. 
Because the samples were asymmetrical, random matches were made until all every participant had at 
least one match, and some participants in the smaller groups had two matches. Participants in all 
groups were paid only for their first random match. 
3. Results and Discussion 
As described previously, each participant in the experiment was asked to make a contribution to 
three different players, one from each of the three nested participant groups. This experimental design 
allows us to examine the ways in which these contributions might differ when the only information the 
participant receives is the group affiliation of the other player. The following analysis is designed to 
examine whether: (I) SSI participants are more generous toward Bangor partners than are UMaine 
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participants; (II) own-group preferences exist; and (III) SSI participant contributions differ across the 
academic discipline of the participant. 
We start by presenting some descriptive and comparative statistics and then present the results of 
regression analysis. Table 1 presents mean contribution by each participant group to each of the three 
partner groups. An analysis of variance in contributions by donor groups reveals that only 7.4% of the 
variation was between groups, and demonstrating that when responses are pooled, there is no 
significant difference between groups (F = 0.202, p = 0.895). A second pooled ANOVA in 
contributions by recipient group found that only 15% of the variation was between groups, and failed 
to reject the traditional null hypothesis of no difference between group means (F = 0.434, p = 0.728) in the 
pooled dataset. 
Table 1. Mean contributions of donors to dyadic public goods game by partner in US 
dollars. Contributions from two matched participants were invested in a shared fund, which 
grew in value and was then split evenly between the two participants. 
  Partner 
Donor N Bangor SSI UMaine 
Bangor 78 7.05 6.51 6.92 
SSI 41 6.15 7.27 6.95 
UMaine 81 6.43 7.28 6.74 
These preliminary results beg the question of how cooperative contributions respond to treatment 
and control variables when recipient and donor are included. We employed multiple regression models 
to address our three hypotheses. 
3.1. Control Variables 
Control variables used in the models are based upon prior research demonstrating their significance 
in predicting contributions in cooperative games. Male gender (MALE) is used as a control variable 
because gender has often been found to influence behavior in public goods [39,40] and related 
experiments [41,42]. Strong identification with the partner group (STRONGID) is included because it 
can have a positive effect on contributions. STRONGID is a dummy variable taking on the value of 1 
when participants answered the “How strongly do you identify yourself with (Bangor/SSI/UMaine)”? 
question as 4 or greater on a Likert scale of 1–5. If participants strongly identify with groups other than 
their own, then the difference between own group and other group contributions will be affected. 
Controlling for strong identification allows for the isolation of the group effect. Contributions are also 
likely to be affected by baseline individual differences in trust. For this reason, the variable TRUST is 
used as a control. This dummy variable takes on a value of 1 when participants answered all of the 
following three questions as 4 or greater on a Likert scale of 1–5: “How likely are you to trust a person 
of the following types? (1) Someone I know personally, (2) Someone with similar beliefs and values as 
myself, (3) Someone with compatible economic interests”. The TRUST variable is expected to be 
positively correlated with contributions to partners. 
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3.2. Education and Income 
Ideally, income or education variables would also be used as control variables, but these variables 
are too highly correlated with group membership in this sample. As well, education and income do not 
possess sufficient variation particularly when examining contributions made by SSI and UMaine 
participants, who, as faculty members, have all attained at least a graduate degree. Income differs 
across groups defined by Bangor group participant status as compared with the two faculty groups 
together (Chi-square = 51.548, p = 0.000). This is problematic for regression models due to 
collinearity between the dummy variable, BANGOR, and the income classes. Income is a categorical 
data series in this study. Education levels are also collinear with BANGOR, with education levels 
significantly lower for Bangor resident participants than for faculty. There is also evidence that at least 
one of the education code groups has a different income distribution (Chi-square = 50.776, p = 0.000), 
suggesting that there is likely collinearity between income and education level. While education and 
income variables are therefore omitted in the formal analysis, we return to them in the discussion  
and conclusion. 
3.3. Models 
We used two distinct types of regression to address our hypotheses. First, we used tobit model with 
a lower limit of 0 and upper limit of 10 to address the truncated dependent variable; participants were 
only able to contribute whole dollar amounts between $0 and $10. We also used an ordered probit 
model in which the contributions were categorized into three labeled groups: less than $5 (free-rider), 
exactly $5 (egalitarian), and greater than $5 (cooperator). This model type was chosen because the 
difference between contributions of 2 and 3 dollars, for example, are not thought to have the same 
meaning as the difference between contributions of 5 and 6 dollars. These categories are perhaps more 
meaningful in terms of measuring the salient psychological cues that govern cooperative tendencies. 
For each hypothesis we implemented regressions with and without the hypothesized explanatory 
variables for both types of model. All models employ all three control variables, MALE, STRONGID, 
and TRUST. Tobit and ordered probit results are qualitatively similar. We report tobit model results in 
the main text, and provide full model specifications and regression results for both model families in 
the appendix. 
3.3.1. Hypothesis 1: Boundary Spanning—Project Faculty Will Cooperate More with Bangor 
Residents than Other Faculty 
To explain contributions to Bangor partners, we formulated models in which the dependent variable 
is contributions to Bangor partners (CONTRIBBGR). One set of models pools observations from all 
three participant types, and a second set of models adds dummy variables for SSI and UMAINE 
participants. For example, we present the two tobit regression models used in hypothesis 1, below.  
All subsequent analyses are constructed in a similar fashion. We expected that SSI participants would 
cooperate more with Bangor residents than would UMaine faculty in general. 
Contrib = β0 + β1MALE + β2STRONGID + β3TRUST + ϵ 
(1) 
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Contrib = β0 + β1MALE + β2STRONGID + β3TRUST + α0SSI + α1UMAINE + ϵ (2) 
3.3.2. Hypothesis 2: Group Cooperation—Project Faculty Will Have the Highest Level of Internal 
Cooperation of Any Group 
We explored this hypothesis by first seeking to understand whether or not participants hold a 
preference group-centric cooperation demonstrated by higher contributions to fellow group members 
than to members of other groups. We follow the same procedure we used for hypothesis 1 save that 
here we use three different dependent variables, one for each participant type, making for a total of  
6 models. These models are implemented by restricting the sample to a single group of participants at a 
time. We run the pair of models once using only the 93 observations derived from SSI participants in 
order to determine whether or not SSI participants act more favorably towards SSI partners than they 
do towards UMaine or Bangor partners. They are then run again using the observations from only the 
UMaine participants and, subsequently, Bangor participants. We compare the resulting regression for 
each model set to determine whether there is a significant difference between contributions based upon 
partner group. This is accomplished through inclusion of two of three dummy variables, 
SSIPARTNER, UMPARTNER, and BGRPARTNER, depending upon which group is being 
examined. The donor participant is always designated as intercept category. We hypothesized 
participants of all types will prefer to cooperate with their peers of the same group, and that SSI 
participants would demonstrate the highest level of in-group cooperation. 
3.3.3. Hypothesis 3: Disciplines—Contributions Will Differ by Academic Discipline within the Project 
Our final question centers on the influence of academic discipline, broadly defined, on SSI 
participants’ contributions to partners. The models used here to explore the relationship between 
academic discipline and contributions are similar to those used to examine own-group preference in 
hypothesis 2. Analyses were constructed to match the prior two hypotheses, with two model variants in 
which the hypothetical variables are either pooled or broken into dummy variables for each of the 
academic discipline groups. The discipline groups are social science, physical science and biological 
science, and are denoted with the variables SOCSCI (n = 11), PHYSCI (n = 5), and BIOSCI (n = 13), 
respectively. Finally, we a fourth dummy, OTHDISC, for those disciplines that do not fit in our simple 
typology. The variable SOCSCI (n = 2) is used as the intercept case, and the sample is restricted to SSI 
participants. We predicted that cooperative contributions will vary by academic discipline within SSI, 
but we do not have any further priors about such variation. 
4. Results 
Our results diverged from the hypothetical predictions in interesting ways. With regards to the first 
hypothesis, we found no significant difference in contributions to Bangor partners between SSI and 
UMaine participants. Second, we find evidence that the identity of one’s own group influences 
cooperative partner preferences differently across our study populations. We did not find evidence that 
SSI participants contributed more to their own group than UMaine partners. However, our models 
suggest SSI participants were less likely to be cooperators when interacting with Bangor partners than 
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when interacting with their own group. However, that effect did not emerge in both tobit and probit 
model families. Surprisingly, however, the models suggest that for UMaine participants, there is a 
preference for cooperating with SSI partners over one’s own group. Meanwhile, we find no evidence 
that Bangor participants exhibit any cooperative preference across their partner populations. Lastly, we 
find the strongest evidence for disciplinary influences on cooperation. Physical scientists amongst the 
SSI faculty tend to be less cooperative within this experiment, as evaluated across all four models.  
In addition, having a Bangor partner also decreases the probability of a contributing generously, for all 
disciplinary categories in SSI. Below we summarize the results of the regression analysis, and we 
present the full detail in the appendix. 
4.1. Hypothesis 1: Boundary Spanning—Project Faculty Will Cooperate More with Bangor Residents 
than Other Faculty 
The first set of models sought to determine whether there was a significant difference between 
contributions made by SSI participants and UMaine participants when giving to Bangor partners.  
We find no significant difference between contributions to Bangor partners made by SSI participants 
and those made by UMaine participants, for either tobit or probit variations. See the appendix for 
model specifications and regression tables. 
4.2. Hypothesis 2: Group Cooperation—Project Faculty Will Have the Highest Level of Internal 
Cooperation of Any Group 
Our next question addresses how own-group cooperation compares across groups. The preliminary 
ANOVA showed no differences across groups by donor or recipient. Against this background, we 
focus on whether or not participants in a given group demonstrate in-group cooperative preferences in 
comparison to those with other groups. As explained in the analysis section, models were run for all 
three participant types separately. The full results of all 12 regressions are presented in the appendix. 
First, we examine contributions made by SSI participants. The probit model suggests the existence 
of possible own-group preference. In this model, giving to a Bangor partner is associated with a lower 
probability of making a contribution with a value that falls within the highest category. This means that 
SSI participants are less likely to be cooperators when interacting with Bangor partners than when 
interacting with their own group. The same effect was not found when SSI contributions to UMaine 
partners were considered. However, this effect was small (–0.529) and only significant at the 90% 
confidence level. 
When we use observations from UMaine participants, we found no evidence for own-group 
preference in either tobit or probit variants. However, we did find mild evidence in the tobit model that 
UMaine participants prefer to cooperate more with SSI partners than with other UMaine faculty. 
UMaine participants tended to contribute $2 more to SSI participants than to other UMaine faculty, at 
the 90% confidence level. This set of models also finds significance in both MALE and TRUST 
variables. As expected, the signs of these coefficients are negative and positive, respectively. 
We also ran the same model to determine whether an own-group preference exists for Bangor 
participants. No significant evidence was found to support any partner group effect for Bangor 
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participants. These models do not find any significant difference between partner groups when 
focusing solely on Bangor participants. 
4.3. Hypothesis 3: Discipline—Contributions Will Differ by Academic Discipline within the Project 
Finally, we tested if the type of academic discipline of SSI faculty members has any relationship 
with contributions to partners. Both families of models provide support for our hypothesis that 
contributions in the public goods game will vary according to academic discipline. We find that SSI 
faculty members who are physical scientists tend to be less cooperative within the context of this 
experiment. Estimates from the tobit model suggest that those in the physical sciences tend to 
contribute as much as $3 less on average than social scientists. This effect is found in all four models 
at the 95% and 90% confidence levels for tobit and probit models respectively. In addition, having a 
Bangor partner also decreases the probability of a contributing generously within the SSI population. 
Both the tobit and the ordered probit models find significance in the BGRPARTNER variable.  
The results of the disciplinary analysis are detailed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Tobit regression show that academic discipline influences contributions made by 
SSI participants. 
 Base model Disciplines 
Disciplines& 
Partners 
Constant 
6.831 *** 
(1.226) 
7.661 *** 
(1.517) 
9.121 *** 
(1.745) 
Male 
1.493 
(1.124) 
1.412 
(1.110) 
1.292 
(1.102) 
Trust 
0.718 
(1.102) 
0.651 
(1.103) 
0.673 
(1.087) 
Strong Identification 
with Partner Group 
0.129 
(1.063) 
−0.100 
(1.048) 
−0.680 
(1.255) 
Physical Sciences  
−2.958 ** 
(1.493) 
−3.056 ** 
(1.478) 
Biological Sciences  
−0.626 
(1.177) 
−0.708 
(1.168) 
Other Discipline  
1.815 
(2.315) 
1.697 
(2.281) 
Bangor   
−2.128 * 
(1.274) 
UMaine   
−0.897 
(1.303) 
Log likelihood −190.767 −187.900 −186.496 
No. Observations 93 93 93 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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5. Conclusions 
We did not find strong evidence for two of our three hypotheses. We hypothesized that SSI players 
would contribute more to Bangor partners than would UMaine faculty in general because SSI faculty 
have had significant exposure to the concepts of boundary spanning, citizen-scientist collaboration, 
and cooperative stakeholder partnerships. Contrary to predictions, UMaine and SSI players cooperated 
with Bangor partners about equally. There are a number of ways to view this result, with hopeful and 
pessimistic overtones for the success of sustainability science projects. On the one hand, the results 
show no effect of participation in the sustainability project. But we do not believe that a lack of 
difference signals that the SSI organization has not enhanced the ability of its researchers to cooperate 
across institutional boundaries. To the contrary, SSI researchers have had developed significant 
ongoing collaborative partnerships with industry, municipal government, state government, non-profit 
organizations, primary schools, and other academic institutions, many of which would not have 
materialized without the organizational energy and funding that SSI provides. Thus, one explanation is 
that researcher–stakeholder partnerships are difficult to establish, develop only over a period of many 
years, require significant investments of energy and time to maintain. Moreover, Hutchins et al. [43] 
suggests that interest in developing community-university partnerships is in part a function of the 
helpfulness, institutional proximity, familiarity and levels of trust one has with a potential collaborator. 
In this sense, our measurement is imperfect because it does not measure collaborations made or in the 
making, but rather hypothetical relationships with anonymous partners. Unfortunately, logistical 
complexities made measuring cooperation with current SSI stakeholders impractical. The one-shot 
measurement of cooperation is necessarily artificial, and could be missing the effect of real behavioral 
change regarding cooperative research partnerships. However, it seems unlikely that the experiment 
does not measure some related tendency for initiating cooperation. 
We suspect instead that the primary reason that SSI and UMaine players both contribute about the 
same amount to Bangor partners rather that the faculty at the land grant university are already willing 
to engage and cooperate with local citizens, as indeed they already have. Viewed in this way, the lack 
of difference suggests that the university may already be achieving some amount of the outreach that 
leading sustainability scientists call for [44,45], or at least researchers may be willing to do  
initiate such cooperative ventures. Perhaps, then land-grant universities present fertile ground for 
researcher–stakeholder collaborations in sustainability science. We conclude that the bar for successful 
cooperative researcher–stakeholder partnerships is very high indeed, and that efforts such as the SSI  
do not so much change faculty interest or willingness to collaborate with citizens as it does their ability 
to do so. 
We also hypothesized an own-group cooperation bias such that SSI players would be more 
cooperative with other SSI players than with players form other groups. However, we did not find a 
strong pattern of own-group bias across any of our groups. To the contrary, the UMaine faculty tended 
to contribute more to SSI than to other UMaine faculty. However, SSI players did contribute more to 
other SSI players than to Bangor players. This might be a result of diffusion in the strength of group 
identity with population size. As the SSI is the smallest group, members simply interact more with 
each other than do those of UMaine faculty in general. Likewise, SSI and UMaine faculty share 
institutional environments while Bangor residents may share very little with each other. 
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Finally, we found strong evidence for our third hypothesis, that disciplinary differences may 
influence our measure of generalized cooperation. Within the SSI, physical scientists contribute less 
than other disciplinary categories across four distinct regression formulations. This difference is 
intriguing, and suggests that social and physical scientists may have a markedly different academic 
culture, with physical scientists being less inclined to short-term collaboration. Academics are likely 
conditioned by their disciplinary environments to have different expectations around collaboration.  
It is well known that many humanities some social sciences tend towards single-author publications, 
while a large fraction of the natural sciences commonly produce mostly multiple authored 
publications. A similar pattern could hold true for the collaborations that precede publication. This,  
in turn, could be due to the nature of their work. Project durations, funding patterns, and required 
people-hours for minimal research completion may influence the structure of successful collaborations in 
each field, and as a result the inclinations of researchers to even approach collaboration when the 
opportunity arises. Importantly, we do not consider this disciplinary difference to be an indictment of 
cooperation in the physical sciences at the University of Maine or within the SSI. Instead, we consider 
this a measure of a cultural difference that should be explored in the course of establishing strong 
interdisciplinary collaborations, as SSI continues to do. 
This study demonstrates that simple experimental economic games measuring foundational 
dimensions of prosociality and social capital such as trust, cooperation, and reciprocity can be useful in 
measuring and diagnosing behavioral patterns within institutional settings for applied research, and can 
reveal unexpected results. With refinement, experimental economic games of this sort could be used to 
diagnose institutional performance and help to guide institutional design by directly assessing 
fundamental social outcomes. In the ideal context institutional design experiments could be conducted 
with such measures in mind, and outcomes evaluated via randomized controlled trials. There are, 
however, notable limitations in implementing behavioral experiments within an organization of limited 
size. One such limitation is the “small world” effect in small organizations in which the participants 
may be too socially proximate to the researchers themselves, and their behavior influenced by 
foreknowledge of the questions, methods or intentionality of the evaluators. Another limitation of these 
methods is the potential for the spread of negative impressions of embedded evaluators. Additionally, 
those seeking to employ experimental economics games as applied measures of institutional efficacy 
face additional challenges. One challenge is in how to tailor existing games to institutional structure 
while maintaining comparability with the literature. Another challenge is the importance of 
maintaining and building trust, even while measuring it, or related variables. 
Despite these limitations and challenges, we believe that simple experimental economic games such 
as the public goods, dictator, ultimatum, and trust games have great potential in evaluating behavior 
within and between organizations and for improving institutional efficacy. This insight should be of 
particular interest to sustainability science efforts in which the need to bridge institutional and cultural 
boundaries is given such emphasis. 
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Appendix 
Complete Model Specifications and Results 
We constructed tobit and ordered probit models for each hypothesis, and compared models that 
include and exclude the variables of interest. Results that appear consistent across both types of model 
are given the highest level of certainty. Here we present all model specifications for each hypothesis 
followed by regression results. The dependent variable Contrib is associated with the continuous but 
truncated tobit regression models, and ContribCat with the ordered probit models which employ an 
ordered, categorized dependent variable. Interpretation is provided in the main text. 
Hypothesis 1: When partnered with Bangor participants, SSI participants will cooperate more than 
will UMaine participants. 
                                       (3) 
                                                      (4) 
                                          (5) 
                                                         (6) 
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Table A1. Explaining contributions to Bangor partners—Models 1.1–1.4. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses. 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals will cooperate preferentially with their own groups. 
                                       (7) 
                                                    
               
(8) 
                                          (9) 
                                                              
                
(10) 
Models 2.1–2.4 are run separately for all three groups of participants, and are summarized in  
Tables A2–A4. 
  
 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 
Dependent Variable 
Contribution 
(tobit) 
Contribution 
(tobit) 
Contribution 
category 
(ordered probit) 
Contribution 
category 
(ordered probit) 
Constant 
7.034 *** 
(0.769) 
7.547 *** 
(0.904) 
1.021 *** 
(0.200) 
1.090 *** 
(0.232) 
Male 
−0.105 
(0.762) 
−0.038 
(0.763) 
−0.309 * 
(0.186) 
−0.300 
(0.187) 
Trust 
0.672 
(0.769) 
0.719 
(0.768) 
0.191 
(0.186) 
0.196 
(0.186) 
Strong 
Identification with 
Partner Group 
1.149 
(0.732) 
0.944 
(0.758) 
0.240 
(0.175) 
0.214 
(0.182) 
SSI Partner  
−0.750 
(1.059) 
 
−0.090 
(0.251) 
UMaine Partner  
−0.873 
(0.808) 
 
−0.120 
(0.194) 
Log likelihood −390.477 −389.852 −181.516 −181.319 
Restricted log 
likelihood 
  −184.971 −184.971 
Significance level   0.075 ** 0.199 
Mu(01)   
0.939 
(0.108) 
0.939 
(0.108) 
No. Observations 184 184 184 184 
Sustainability 2014, 6 1188 
 
 
Table A2. Exploring own-group preference in SSI participants—Models 2.1–2.4. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses. 
Table A3. Exploring own-group preference in UMaine participants—Models 2.1–2.4. 
 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 
Dependent Variable 
Contribution 
(tobit) 
Contribution 
(tobit) 
Contribution 
category 
(ordered probit) 
Contribution 
category 
(ordered probit) 
Constant 
6.831 *** 
(1.226) 
8.167 *** 
(1.489) 
1.035 *** 
(0.317) 
1.408 *** 
(0.392) 
Male 
1.493 
(1.124) 
1.415 
(1.117) 
0.403 
(0.264) 
0.369 
(0.266) 
Trust 
0.718 
(1.102) 
0.738 
(1.089) 
0.091 
(0.260) 
0.099 
(0.262) 
Strong 
Identification with 
Partner Group 
0.129 
(1.063) 
−0.314 
(1.264) 
0.083 
(0.251) 
−0.132 
(0.304) 
Bangor Partner  
−2.054 
(1.319) 
 
−0.529 * 
(0.319) 
UMaine Partner  
−1.076 
(1.347) 
 
−0.082 
(0.325) 
Log likelihood −190.767 −189.521 −82.859 −81.391 
Restricted log 
likelihood 
  −84.047 −84.047 
Significance level   0.498 0.379 
Mu(01)   
1.231 *** 
(0.188) 
1.258 *** 
(0.192) 
Observations 93 93 93 93 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 
Dependent Variable 
Contribution 
(tobit) 
Contribution 
(tobit) 
Contribution 
category 
(ordered probit) 
Contribution 
category 
(ordered probit) 
Constant 
7.248 *** 
(0.892) 
6.073 *** 
(1.312) 
1.107 *** 
(0.198) 
1.030 *** 
(0.282) 
Male 
−0.008 
(0.861) 
−0.003 
(0.854) 
−0.314 * 
(0.182) 
−0.311 * 
(0.183) 
Trust 
2.099 ** 
(0.840) 
2.144 ** 
(0.833) 
0.563 *** 
(0.177) 
0.575 *** 
(0.178) 
Strong 
Identification with 
Partner Group 
0.254 
(0.777) 
1.150 
(0.987) 
0.068 
(0.159) 
0.159 
(0.202) 
Bangor Partner  
0.209 
(1.059) 
 
−0.136 
(0.218) 
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Table A3. Cont. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses. 
Table A4. Exploring own-group preference in Bangor participants—Models 2.1–2.4. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses.  
Hypothesis 3: SSI participant contributions will differ by academic discipline. 
                                                
                      
(11) 
                                                  (12) 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 
SSI Partner  
2.022* 
(1.204) 
 
0.266 
(0.247) 
Log likelihood −462.113 −460.041 −210.337 −208.309 
Restricted log 
likelihood 
  −217.984 −217.984 
Significance level   0.002 0.002 
Mu(01)   
0.950 *** 
(0.102) 
0.961 *** 
(0.103) 
Observations 225 225 225 225 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 
Dependent Variable 
Contribution 
(tobit) 
Contribution 
(tobit) 
Contribution 
category 
(ordered probit) 
Contribution 
category 
(ordered probit) 
Constant 
7.624 *** 
(0.665) 
7.963 *** 
(0.956) 
1.007 *** 
(0.158) 
1.042 *** 
(0.217) 
Male 
0.310 
(0.731) 
0.292 
(0.730) 
−0.261 
(0.161) 
−0.263 
(0.161) 
Trust 
0.190 
(0.781) 
0.240 
(0.784) 
−0.109 
(0.170) 
−0.103 
(0.171) 
Strong Identification 
with Partner Group 
0.784 
(0.796) 
0.476 
(0.911) 
0.104 
(0.174) 
0.081 
(0.198) 
SSI Partner  
−0.748 
(0.998) 
 
−0.054 
(0.216) 
UMaine Partner  
−0.009 
(0.926) 
 
−0.263 
(0.161) 
Log likelihood −488.480 −488.069  −226.241 
Restricted log 
likelihood 
   −227.911 
Significance level    0.648 
Mu(01)   
0.651 *** 
(0.081) 
0.652 *** 
(0.081) 
Observations 234 234 234 234 
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(13) 
                                                 
                                               
(14) 
Table A5. Correlations between academic discipline and contributions made by SSI participants. 
*, **, *** indicates significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. Standard error in parentheses. 
© 2014 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article 
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/). 
 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4 
Dependent Variable 
Contribution 
(tobit) 
Contribution 
(tobit) 
Contribution 
category 
(ordered probit) 
Contribution 
category 
(ordered probit) 
Constant 
7.661 *** 
(1.517) 
9.121 *** 
(1.745) 
1.204 *** 
(0.403) 
1.666 *** 
(0.479) 
Male 
1.412 
(1.110) 
1.292 
(1.102) 
0.386 
(0.273) 
0.338 
(0.276) 
Trust 
0.651 
(1.103) 
0.673 
(1.087) 
0.057 
(0.272) 
0.066 
(0.275) 
Strong Identification 
with Partner Group 
−0.100 
(1.048) 
−0.680 
(1.255) 
0.047 
(0.260) 
−0.213 
(0.320) 
Physical Sciences 
−2.958 ** 
(1.493) 
−3.056 ** 
(1.478) 
−0.641 * 
(0.361) 
−0.717 * 
(0.367) 
Biological Sciences 
–0.626 
(1.177) 
−0.708 
(1.168) 
−0.014 
(0.293) 
−0.069 
(0.298) 
Other Discipline 
1.815 
(2.315) 
1.697 
(2.281) 
0.489 
(0.619) 
0.452 
(0.630) 
Bangor  
−2.128 * 
(1.274) 
 
−0.578 * 
(0.324) 
UMaine  
−0.897 
(1.303) 
 
−0.062 
(0.332) 
Log likelihood −187.900 −186.496 −80.229 −78.498 
Restricted log likelihood   −84.047 −84.047 
Significance level   0.266 0.196 
Mu(01)   
1.263 *** 
(0.191) 
1.296 *** 
Observations 93 93 93 93 
